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ABSTRACT: The causal powers that I have, such as the ability to go to the store for 
cold beer, for instance are the same causal powers as those had by the human 
animal closely associated with me. That is, the biological organism that invari-
ably stares back at me, whenever I look in the mirror. Thus, if I want to avoid 
gratuitous causal overdetermination – i.e. if I want to avoid positing two separate 
individuals with identical, and thus redundant, causal powers – as I justifiably do, 
then I should adopt animalism. That is, the view that I have the same persistence 
conditions as those had by a biological organism.
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Introduction
Throughout the recent history of philosophy, causal powers1, combined 
with prohibiting gratuitous causal overdetermination, have often been 
used as a guide to how the world hangs together. That is, if x and y have 
the causal power to bring about F, and we want to avoid gratuitous causal 
overdetermination, then we should revise our ontology with regard to x 
and y. To illustrate the point, consider a couple arguments in the literature: 
first, there is the argument, in favor of identity theory – i.e. the claim that 
mental and neural events are identical – known as the exclusion argument 
(cf. Papineau 2002: 17–19, Lewis 1966, Sturgeon 1998), on one hand, and 
second, there is the argument in favor of mereological nihilism – i.e. the 
claim that there are no medium-sized, physical objects (e.g. there are no 
1 For our purposes, if agent, S, has the causal power to do x, S has the ability to bring 
x about.
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tables, only atoms arranged table-wise) – known as the overdetermination 
argument (cf. Merricks 2001), on the other hand.
Roughly sketched, the exclusion and overdetermination arguments 
each have the following structure: X is sufficiently explained by M and N, 
on their own. Thus, if we want to avoid gratuitous causal overdetermination, 
then we should conclude either that M’s just are identical to N’s, or elimi-
nate either M’s or N’s. That is, these arguments share the following claim: 
gratuitous causal overdetermination, no matter how it manifests itself, is a 
good reason to revise one’s ontology. Call this the avoidance rule.
In this paper, I defend a novel argument – call it the argument from 
causal powers – for the animalist theory of personal identity (cf. Olson 
1997, Snowdon 1990). This is the view that we have the same persistence 
conditions as those of a biological organism. The argument parallels influ-
ential and powerful arguments, like the exclusion and overdetermination 
arguments, which all respect the avoidance rule. Roughly sketched, the 
argument I have in mind proceeds as follows.
First, we have the same causal powers, to go about our everyday 
lives, as the human animal that invariably follows us around. Thus, 
if we want to avoid positing two individuals, who have identical, 
and redundant causal powers, all the while respecting the prohibi-
tion on gratuitous causal overdetermination, then we ought to adopt 
animalism.
Now, the layout of this paper is simple. In the first section, I briefly in-
troduce a similar argument to one I use to defend animalism, featured in the 
literature, for identity theory. It is usually known as the causal exclusion 
argument. Call it the Exclusion Argument. In the second section, I flesh 
out an argument for mereological nihilism known as an overdetermination 
argument. Call it the overdetermination argument. In the section after that, 
I defend an argument that you and I are identical to the human animals with 
which we seem to be invariably associated. That is, we have the same per-
sistence conditions as those of a biological organism. Finally, I deal with a 
potential objection. For the sake of brevity, my comments are brief.
I should note, before advancing further into the philosophical weeds, 
that this paper is modest in its aims. That is, I only want to provide some 
motivation for animalism. This paper is not meant to satisfy those who 
hold firmly that our persistence conditions are exhausted by the psycho-
logical. Rather, the argument from causal powers is only meant to pressure 
those who reject animalism, to explain how their view does not force them 
to accept counterintuitive consequences – for example, that I, along with 
my human animal companion, each have identical, redundant causal po-
wers, which violate avoidance rule.
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The Exclusion Argument
There is a popular argument, for the claim that the mental and neural are 
identical, on the basis of causal considerations, called the exclusion argu-
ment. Consider the following passage (from Papineau 2002: 17), which 
nicely sums up the exclusion argument:
Let me outline what I take to be the canonical argument for materialism. 
Setting to one side all complications, which can be discussed later, it can 
be put as follows. Many effects that we attribute to conscious causes have 
full physical causes. But it would be absurd to suppose that these effects are 
caused twice over. So the conscious causes must be identical to some part of 
those physical causes.
I take it, from our common, although admittedly, incomplete knowledge of 
basic neurology that to the extent that we are willing to attribute the causal 
impetus of behavior, to our mental states and of course, to the extent that 
we rightly respect the prohibition against gratuitous causal overdetermina-
tion, then, if we are to incorporate the work done by brains, causing our 
behavior, then we should identify our conscious episodes with our brain 
states. This is the only solution which respects the causal efficacy of brain 
and mental states, on the one hand, and the prohibition against gratuitous 
causal overdetermination2, on the other.
Perhaps the following example will clarify. Call it the stove example.
Suppose that Smith, who is particularly fond of hot drinks, decides to 
make Green tea, before heading off to bed. A bit after turning off the 
stove, Smith turns around to grab the honey, and forgetting that the 
stove is still hot, uses it brace himself. He immediate feels excruciat-
ing pain, causing him to almost immediately pull his hand away from 
the hot stove.
There are a couple of ingredients to this example, which should be nailed 
down, if they are to be effective at illustrating how the exclusion argument 
works.
First, notice that Smith draws his hand away, almost instantaneously, 
just in virtue of the excruciating pain he felt, when he burned his hand. 
Now, this is not to say that there were no other causal components that 
led to Smith drawing his hand away, but surely the excruciating pain was 
an essential causal component of the explanation. To deny that this is to 
2 There are instances where respecting the prohibition on causal overdetermination 
has little to recommend it. For example, suppose that Jones accidentally throws a baseball 
through a neighbor’s window, just as Smith is vandalizing that same window with a base-
ball bat. Surely, in that case, each cause is sufficient, on its own, to shatter the neighbor’s 
window. This is just an instance of causal overdetermination, instead of an instance of 
gratuitous causal overdetermination.
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concede something akin to epiphenomenalism (cf. Jackson 1982) – i.e. 
the view that physical causes result in mental effects, while the mental is 
causally impotent. To the extent that we think that mental goings-on have 
causal powers is the extent to which we should grant that being in excruci-
ating pain is an essential part of the explanation as to why Smith drew his 
hand away from the hot stove. Call this the mental cause.
Second, there were a series of brain states, and neural goings-on, 
which were sufficient, causally speaking, to bring about Smith almost in-
stantly moving his hand away from the hot stove. After all, it is common 
knowledge that scientists can stimulate the brain in just the right spot so 
as to produce a variety of mental events, and behaviors, from seeing vari-
ous colors, to animating the body of someone to do such-and-such, even 
though the subject who is being manipulated did not intend to do such-
and-such. This is evidence – along with the fact that people lose the ability 
to do various things, if they have a stroke, Alzheimer’s disease, etc. – that 
neural goings-on are sufficient to produce behavior. Call this the neural 
cause.
Finally, there is nothing much to be grained, explanatorily speaking, 
by insisting that the feeling of pain (i.e. the mental states), on the one 
hand, and the neural goings-on, on the other hand, are sufficient and sepa-
rate causes for Smith moving his hand away from the hot stove. Thus, if 
we respect the prohibition on gratuitous causal overdetermination, then 
we have good reason to conclude that the mental states and the neural 
goings-on are just the same thing. That is, mental events are nothing over 
and above neural events.
Thus, with the exclusion argument, for identity theory, explained and 
motivated, we move on to formulate the overdetermination argument for 
mereological nihilism. These arguments are meant to illuminate a strategy 
for reducing or eliminating, those entities do not earn their causal or ex-
planatory keep. That is, there are good reasons to suppose we should cut 
them out of what we go about positing, ontologically speaking.
The Overdetermination Argument
There is a debate raging, within the metaphysics of material objects, as 
to whether medium-sized objects (e.g. trees, tables, cars etc.) exist. There 
are those who hold that such objects do not exist. That is, they hold that 
there really are no such objects as tables, cars and trees, even though there 
are atoms arranged table, car and tree-wise. Call this view mereological 
nihilism. Those who accept this view hold that strictly speaking there are 
no such objects as trees and cars, even though we might be inclined to 
think that there are. There is an infamous and controversial argument for 
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mereological nihilism, called the overdetermination argument. The fol-
lowing passage (Merricks 2003: 701, along with, cf. Merricks 2001: 56) 
succinctly lays out the overdetermination argument:
[…] I argue that anything a baseball causes – if baseballs exist – is also 
caused by the baseball’s atoms working in concert. Moreover, a baseball is 
‘casually irrelevant’ to what its atoms cause. These two claims imply that 
baseballs, if they existed, would be at best mere overdeterminers of whatever 
they cause.
Simply put, there is good reason to suppose that atoms arranged base-
ball-wise have the causal power to smash a window, all on their own, 
without positing the existence of a baseball over and above that of atoms 
arranged baseball-wise. Put a bit differently, it is plausible to suppose that 
everyone accepts a bunch of atoms, arranged baseball-wise, would have 
the causal powers, if they worked in tandem, to smash a window. If we 
accept that atoms exist, then there is a good reason, vis-à-vis not positing 
individuals with redundant causal powers, to eliminate baseballs from our 
ontology. That is, if we start with atoms, arranged such-and-such, along 
with a prohibition on gratuitous causal powers overdetermination, on the 
one hand, and positing a redundant object, vis-à-vis causal powers, on the 
other hand, then there is good reason, to eliminate objects, over and above 
atoms which are arranged object-wise, from our ontology.
Perhaps it might help to think of the overdetermination argument, in 
light of a different, though similar example:
Suppose that the local Sheriff, in trying to stop a bank robbery from 
turning into a hostage situation, shoots one of the suspects, killing 
him on the spot. That is, the bullet from the Sheriff’s gun resulted in 
the death of the bank robber. Call this the shooting example.
There are a couple of explanatory parts to this example.
First, notice that the bullet itself has the causal power, in the right con-
text, to cause the death of the bank robber. That is, the bullet has the ability, 
in the right context, to tear throw soft tissues causing severe organ damage, 
substantial blood loss and death. At least at first pass, this seems like a 
good explanation for why it was that the bank robber died from the Sher-
iff’s gunshot. Second however, it appears that the atoms which compose 
the bullet, if they were working in concert and within an appropriate set of 
circumstances, would have the causal powers necessary to take the life of 
the bank robber. That is, if the bullet itself has the causal power to kill the 
bank robber, and the bullet is comprised of atoms working in tandem, then 
it follows that the atoms that compose the bullet, working together, have 
the causal powers to kill the bank robber, in the right context.
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Now that we have a feel for the causal exclusion strategy, for manag-
ing our ontology, I can explain the argument in favor of animalism in the 
next section, and respond to a serious objection in the section after that.
The Causal Powers Argument
Surely, in some sense or other, I am an animal. That is, I require food, 
water and sleep; I engage in sexual intercourse from time to time; I have 
genetic material, and an extensive evolutionary history. If I do not qualify 
as an animal, in some sense or other, on the basis of those qualities, then 
it is hard to see how any organism could qualify as an animal. The ques-
tion that remains is whether or not, I am primarily (i.e. non-derivatively) a 
human animal, or whether I simply derive those qualities from the human 
animal with which I appear to be invariantly associated.
Further, clearly I enjoy various causal powers throughout most of my 
life. For instance, I have the causal powers required to walk down to the 
grocery store, purchase a cold twelve pack of beer, and walk home to en-
joy it. Call the causal powers necessary for a beer run, Alpha. Of course, 
Alpha requires that I have the necessary causal powers to move, think, 
communicate and so forth, to complete a beer run. Likewise, surely the 
human animal that is invariably associated with me, has the causal po-
wers necessary to do everything that I did vis-à-vis my beer run. That is, 
he has the ability to walk down to the street to the grocery store, find the 
appropriate beer, and communicate with the cashier while purchasing the 
beer etc. Call the causal powers of the human animal, necessary for a beer 
run, Beta.
If we think about the matter – of having causal powers to go on a 
beer run, for example – in a bit more detail, it should be clear that I lack 
the necessary causal powers to go on a beer run, while I was an infant, 
and surely I will lack those abilities as I grow to be an old man. Likewise, 
the human animal that is invariably associated with me, lacked the causal 
powers, to go on a beer run, when he is an infant, and likewise if he ad-
vances into his later years. That is, upon first glance, it appears as though 
the following condition holds:
If I have the causal power to bring about F, then, invariantly, my hu-
man animal companion also has the causal power to bring about F. 
Call this the mirroring principle.
This insight is, roughly, the basis for the causal powers argument for 
animalism. That is, an excellent explanation for the truth of the mirroring 
principle, which enjoys the added virtue of avoiding positing two separate 
individual with redundant, completely overlapping causal powers, is to 
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accept that I am identical to my human animal companion. That is, we are 
the same human animal.
Consider the explanationist argument that I have in mind (i.e. a kind 
of argument that establishes a conclusion, on the basis of explanatory con-
siderations), properly formulated, that proceeds as follows. Call it the ar-
gument from causal powers.
(1) First, I have the causal powers to do such-and-such (e.g. go on a 
beer run, take a hike, read a book and so forth). Surely, the human 
animal that invariably follows me around has the causal powers 
to do such-and-such that I do.
(2) Next, we are right to avoid positing two separate individuals, 
with the same causal powers, without good reason, so as to avoid 
causal overdetermination.
(3) Finally, the most plausible way to explain the causal powers my 
human animal companion and I enjoy, while respecting the pro-
hibition on gratuitous causal overdetermination, is to accept that 
I am identical to my human animal companion3.
(4) Thus, there is good reason to accept animalism.
Now, we are ready to apply our insight to the beer run example. The 
causal powers that I, and my human animal companion, enjoy, with regard 
to going on a beer run, for example, are the same. That is, it seems that 
Alpha and Beta – the causal powers I mentioned earlier – are just differ-
ent ways of naming an identical set of causal powers. Further, there is 
no reason to posit two distinct individuals, myself and my human animal 
companion, to explain Alpha and Beta. Thus, it must be that I am identical 
to a human animal.
There is another argumentative strategy, I could employ, which might 
help clarify what I am after with the argument from causal powers. The 
strategy goes something like this: set up a trilemma, whereby each mem-
ber of the trilemma, on its own, appears plausible, even though, they can-
3 There is a suppressed premise: positing an individual with all of the same causal 
powers, over and above the human animal that invariably follows me about, so as to avoid 
accepting animalism, is to engage in theoretical gratuity.
Simply put, this suppressed premise is meant to illustrate the explanatory redun-
dancy, in positing two X’s that have identical causal powers to explain such-and-such, 
without good reason, when one X is sufficient to explain that such-and-such. Indeed, if we 
want to avoid gratuitous causal overdetermination, when it comes to positing individual 
causes, all by themselves, then, this theoretical virtue surely applies, all the more, to posit-
ing individuals with causal powers.
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not all be true. The trilemma – call it the causal trilemma – might be stated 
as follows:
(A) The human animal, which invariably follows me about, has the 
causal powers to do everything ascribed to me, e.g. I have the 
causal powers to go to the store for cold beer, study for an exam, 
present at a conference, and so on
(B) We should avoid positing entities with the identical, and thus re-
dundant, causal powers, unless and until there are good reasons 
for doing otherwise.
(C) I am not identical to the human animal that invariably follows 
me around. That is, I am something over and above my human 
animal counterpart, vis-à-vis my persistence conditions.
There are a couple of points to be made about the causal trilemma. To begin 
with, it should be clear that human animals have all of the same causal po-
wers that we take ourselves to have. That is, they have the ability to think, 
talk, walk and so forth. Thus, there is good reason to hang onto member (A). 
After all, it would be strange to deny that human animals have all the causal 
powers that we take ourselves to have in light of the causal powers we at-
tribute to a variety of non-human animals. Next, we have seen, throughout 
the paper, that there are good reasons, across the board, to respect the ban 
on gratuitous causal, and causal power, overdetermination, unless and until 
there is good reason to do otherwise. Thus, member (B) is secure. Since, it 
is clearly the case that the members of the causal trilemma, are inconsist-
ent with one another, there is good reason, in the interest of establishing 
consistency, respecting those members of the trilemma that enjoy greater 
plausibility than their trilemma-counterparts, and preserving as many of the 
members of the trilemma as possible, to throw out member (C).
The Appropriation Objection
Unfortunately, that is not the end of the matter. There are those who hold 
that they are, strictly speaking, a collection of psychological conditions 
such as self-consciousness, rationality, memory and so forth. Surely, those 
who hold the psychological view will argue I am not identical to perma-
nent-coma-state counterpart, for instance. Rather, I just appropriated his 
causal resources. In other words, the Lockean – i.e. someone who holds 
that I persist through time just as long as certain psychological conditions 
hold (cf. Nozick 2003: 100) – might object as follows:
I do not have all of the causal powers as my human animal com-
panion, at least in so far as they are mine. Rather, I simply appropriate 
177J. A. LICON: Another Argument for Animalism
many of the causal powers had by my human animal companion, and 
use them for myself, while I am associated, in some respect or other, 
with him. Just like the body I currently inhabit, there is no reason to 
think that the causal powers that I appropriate from him will go with 
me if I were ever to need a body transplant, for instance. Thus, there 
is little reason to accept the mirroring principle – as a guide to my 
persistence conditions – and even less reason to think that animalism 
is well-supported by how we should cut up causal powers. Call this 
the appropriation objection.
Unfortunately, for the Lockean view of personal identity, there are several 
problems with this objection.
One of them is the issue of explanatory fit. Even though my appropri-
ating my human animal companion’s causal powers would explain how 
it is that I have the ability to go to the store for cold beer – just in virtue 
of the ability had by my human animal companion to go to the store for 
cold beer – it is not clear why this is a better explanation than, my human 
animal companion and I, are the same individual. After all, this would be 
a more streamlined explanation, in that it is less complicated than the ap-
propriation story. Additionally, it is the explanation that we should prefer, 
considering the following intuition: if x and y are never seen apart – that 
is, there is never an instance where we find x, without y, or the other way 
around – then that is good prima facie justification that x is identical to y.
Consider the following analogy. On the identity theory, mental events 
just are a subset of neural events, while on the coincident theory – i.e. men-
tal events always travel with neural events, but they are distinct from them 
– there are two entities, x and y, needed to explain seeing x and y together. 
Surely, the coincident theory is just intuitively messier than the identity 
theory. Further, unlike on the identity theory, with the coincident theory, 
not only must we posit separate entities, x and y, but we must also explain 
why they are always travel together. The identity theory easily explains 
this: it is always the case, for anything that is identical, that whenever we 
find x, we find x. That is, if we already knew that x and y were identical, 
then we would expect to find x and y together. However, there must be 
something else at work, on the coincident theory, to explain how it is that 
x and y always travel together. By the same token, it is easier to explain 
why my human animal companion and I are always together, if animalism 
holds, then if its explanatory competitors hold, ceteris paribus.
Suppose we approach the matter a bit differently. We would rightly 
think that the dualist is in trouble, explanatorily speaking, if she argued in 
response to the exclusion argument, for reductive materialism, that mental 
states, along with non-physical minds, lacked the causal ability to bring 
about behavior, and so forth, but rather appropriated that causal ability 
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from the relevant brain state. That is, there is something intuitively dodgy 
about this explanation. It is strange, for a plethora of reasons, for the dual-
ist to make this move. For one thing, it appears to render her metaphysi-
cal contribution, vis-à-vis positing a non-physical mental entity, to mental 
causation, largely superfluous. By the same token, it would be strange, 
not to mention a handicapping admission, for the Lockean to admit that 
she only has certain causal powers merely in virtue of the causal powers 
had by the human animal that is invariably associated with her. It would 
be better, explanatorily speaking, to identify herself with the human ani-
mal that follows her around, than posit two distinct individuals. That is, a 
person exhausted by her psychological components, and a human animal, 
especially where one of them is causally, and explanatorily, impotent.
Furthermore, the appropriation objection and brain transplant cases 
(cf. Hershenov 2004: 449) have a good deal in common – and this com-
mon threat is a serious problem for them. They both hold that there are 
instances, throughout modal space, where I exist without my human ani-
mal companion. Thus, I cannot be a human animal. There are a couple of 
problems with these kinds of moves, often used against animalism. This 
is especially so, if we consider that the properties – assumed by the critic 
applying Leibniz’s Law4, to form an argument for non-identity between a 
person and human animal – to which thought experiments and arguments, 
like the brain transplant cases, presuppose. The critics appear to presup-
pose that if they can show a difference in the modal properties, had by a 
person, on the one hand, and a human animal, on the other hand, then they 
will have overturned animalism. However, that is a faulty assumption. This 
is because I defend a kind of modally-local animalism, rather than animal-
ism that presupposes that, in our travels throughout modal space, the hu-
man animal with whom I am associated and I invariably travel together. 
The point is that divergent modal properties, between my human animal 
companion and I, is not a serious problem for my version of animalism.
It might help clarify, to consider the following point. For example, to 
say that a statue – call the statue, Gamma – depicting the Biblical David, 
and the clay used to depict David – call this Omega – is identical appears 
to be ambiguous between two readings. On the first reading, i.e. the non-
modal reading, to say that Gamma and Omega are identical is just to say 
that the statue depicting David is made of clay. That is, in the actual world, 
and some nearby modal worlds, under many conditions, to find Gamma is 
just to find Omega. The location of one is a good and fairly reliable guide, 
to the location of the other. On the second reading, i.e. the modal reading, 
4 Recall that Leibniz’s law is the following conditional: if, for every property F, object 
x has F if and only if object y has F, then x is identical to y.
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to say that Gamma and Omega are identical is to say that in any possible 
world in which we find Gamma, no matter how far away from the ac-
tual world, we will nonetheless find Omega. However, there is a possible 
world in which the status depicting David gets smashed, leaving only the 
clay, which used to depict the Biblical David, behind. Thus, Gamma and 
Omega come apart in some possible worlds, and thus cannot be the same, 
in a strict modal sense.
That being said, a similar point applies to the version of animalism I 
defend in this paper. That is, it is meant as a nearby-possible-worlds the-
sis, rather than an identity thesis across the entire, relevant parts of modal 
space, where I only exist in those possible worlds in which the human ani-
mal I am associated with also exists. That is, it the view holds that I hap-
pen to be a human animal, in the actual world and many of the surrounding 
possible worlds, within this particular neighborhood in modal space (cf. 
Bailey 2011: 51). The version of animalism I defend is not committed to 
the claim that throughout modal space, wherever you find me, you find a 
human animal. Call this view modal neighborhood animalism.
Moreover, to get a feel for the point I am after, consider the following 
example:
I happen to be an American citizen, at least in the actual world, along 
with some nearby possible worlds. Assuming I do not choose to be 
an ex-patriot, whenever you find me in the actual world, and some 
nearby possible worlds, you will find someone who is an American 
citizen. That being said, it does not follow from that wherever I am 
found, throughout nearby modal space, I am an American citizen. 
After all, I could be just as I am, vis-à-vis identity, even though I 
was born in Turkey. But it nevertheless remains the case that I am an 
American citizen.
Likewise, there is a good reason to suppose that I am a human animal. 
At the very least, that is the explanation we should prefer, as long as we 
accept various causal intuitions, along with respecting the prohibition on 
gratuitous causal, and casual power, overdetermination. If we accept that 
the exclusion and overdetermination arguments have something going for 
them on grounds of causal exclusion, then, on pain of inconsistency, so 
does the argument from causal powers, for the same reasons.
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